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ABSTRACT: Kaplow and Shavell (1994) show that legal rules should not be made contingent upon the
income (wealth, consumption, occupation, etc..) of the parties and conclude from this that "it is
appropriate for economic analysis of legal rules to focus on efficiency and ignore the distribution of
income." We accept the validity and importance of their argument against conditioning legal rules on
these otherwise taxable attributes. But we argue against their apparent conclusion that legal rules should
be set according to efficiency considerations alone.
Using a slight modification of their own model, we find that: 1) even in the presence of an optimal
income tax, any concern for equity dictates that legal rules deviate from efficient standards in a manner
that aids the less well-off—this, so long as there is any heterogeneity in the way that agents respond to the
legal system; 2) when, in addition, income differences are predominant in overall inequality, legal rules
should in fact be adjusted away from efficient standards in a manner that helps low-income individuals;
3) under certain additional conditions, legal rules should be specifically adjusted to correct income-based
inequality—legal rules should not be made contingent on parties' income on a case-by-case basis, but they
should be adjusted across the board in a manner that counteracts income inequality.
Our broader point is that there is no a priori reason to favor any one economic activity over
another—leisure choice over care choice, for instance—in accomplishing redistributional goals. The
optimal redistributional program will involve a mixture of methods and deviations from efficiency in one
domain may even be used to correct inequalities arising in another. We conclude that the extent to which
legal rules should be used for redistributional purposes must be settled empirically and/or on the basis of
factors outside the scope of Kaplow and Shavell's (1994) analysis.
JEL: K00, K34, K13, H21, H23
* I would like to thank the Columbia Law School for its generous logistical support during the course of
this project. I have benefited from helpful conversations with Kyle Bagwell, Jagdish Bhagwati, Aaron
Edlin, Christine Jolls, Marcel Kahan, Ron Miller and Eric Talley. Special thanks go to Louis Kaplow
for detailed and timely comments on an earlier draft.
What role should equity play in structuring legal rules? A recent and already influential
paper by Kaplow and Shavell (1994) ["KS"] adds an important new insight to this age-
old debate. KS argue that courts should not alter legal rules away from efficient
standards by conditioning on parties' incomes (or, more generally, their wealth,
consumption, occupation, etc...)- However strong one's concern for equity, any
redistribution of income affected by distorting legal rules can be more efficiently
accomplished via the income tax. Whether one redistributes income by tax or legal
rule, the distortion to labor/leisure choice is the same: in particular, when legal rules
turn on income, agents will take this into account as much as a tax table in choosing
how much to work. But redistributing via legal rules has the added disadvantage that it
also distorts the behavior that the legal rule is meant to regulate—for example, the
choice of care in tort.
The present paper does not take issue with this argument per se, but rather with the
conclusion that KS and many in the field may have drawn from it: namely that
it is appropriate for economic analysis of legal rules to focus on efficiency and ignore the
distribution of income. [KS (1994), last line of conclusion, p. 677]
or put another way
the normative economic analysis of legal rules should be primarily concerned with efficiency
rather than the distribution of income. [KS (1994), p. 675]
In a sense, the point of this paper is to show that "ignoring the distribution of income"
is not the same as "focusing on efficiency"; that being "primarily concerned with
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efficiency" is not the opposite of being primarily concerned with the distribution of
income.l
In particular, we use KS's own model to make three points about the use of legal
rules as instruments for equity.
First, we show that even in the presence of an optimal income tax—any. concern for
equity dictates that legal rules deviate from efficient standards in a manner that aids the
less well-off—this, so long as there is any. heterogeneity in the way that agents respond
to the legal system. If the well-off tend to be relatively cautious, damages should be set
below harm caused. If the well-off tend to be relatively careless, damages should be set
above harm caused. Either way the tort system should effect a transfer from the more
well-off to less well-off.
Second, we show that if labor income is the primary source of differences in well-
being—if the less well-off are indeed the "poor"—then damages should be specifically
adjusted to help low income individuals.
Third, we show that it may even by optimal to adjust legal rules specifically to
correct income-based inequality. In the KS model this arises when the income
differences predominate and high income individuals tend to be accident prone. In this
1
 The broader assertion that legal rules should be set solely on the basis of efficiency appears elsewhere in
KS. Consider the list of quotes from articles in the second paragraph of KS's footnote 3. Recited as
examples of incorrect thinking, these concern the issue of whether legal rules should be set efficiently,
not the narrower issue of whether legal rules should be conditioned on income (which is not to say that
these sources are immune to KS's critique on the narrower issue).
Consider as well, the "qualifications" that KS provide in a remark at the end of their technical
appendix. These assumptions are unnecessary to the argument against conditioning on income. They do,
on the other hand, constitute an "argument" for setting rules purely on the basis of efficiency: but only in
terms of bare logic. In contrast to the relatively airtight argument against conditioning on income, the
argument from these assumptions is crippled by the assumptions' lack of empirical grounding or even
introspective plausibility. We discuss this more in our remarks.
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case, legal rules, though not made contingent on income per se, will in fact be used to
mitigate the source of income inequality.
How precisely do these findings fit with KS's admonition that damages not be
conditioned on income? A careful explanation goes to the foundations of second best
analysis. Recall from the Second Welfare Theorem that if we could somehow directly
tax individuals' immutable characteristics (preferences and endowments), we could
happily achieve any distribution of well-being that we please with no loss of efficiency.
Unfortunately, all we have to work with are the observable manifestations of the
choices that individuals make based on these unobservable underlying characteristics.
Thus based on preferences and endowments, individuals choose how much to work,
how much to consume, how much care to take, whether to become a landlord. We in
turn observe their income, their consumption, the accidents they cause, their ownership
of renter occupied housing.
From a tax perspective, these observables are essentially imperfect "signals" of the
underlying characteristics that we would really like to get at. They are imperfect
because they are choice-determined and so taxing (subsidizing) them induces tax-
reducing (subsidy increasing) shifts in behavior. If we tax labor income, people work
less. If we "tax" accidents (by raising damages above harm) people are more cautious.
If we tax lessor status, fewer people rent out apartments. Absent some countervailing
externality, this "distortion" of behavior will involve efficiency losses.
Yet, if we care about equity, we may be willing to tolerate some efficiency loss for
the sake of greater equality. In particular, each of these signals will typically have
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some equity content, which is to say that each will be in some direction correlated with
individuals' over all well-being. Either taxing or subsidizing the signal will then have
equalizing effects.
KS's argument that we not condition damages on income generalizes to the
admonition that we not "tangle" the signals in setting these equity-based taxes.2 Thus,
signal B should not be used as a factor in determining how much tax we impose on
signal A. If B is what we are after, we are better off taxing it directly. Getting at B
through A distorts both the behavior generating A and the behavior generating B. KS
highlight the particular point that we should not condition damages on income.
Likewise, we should not condition tax rates on harm caused. Nor should we impose
higher income taxes or damages on landlords, etc.
Yet the admonition not to tangle the signals says nothing about which signals
should be used. Specifically, the argument against conditioning damages on income is
not an argument for leaving legal rules out of our program of equity-based taxation—
i.e., not an argument for setting legal rules solely on the basis of efficiency. Quite the
contrary, legal rules will always have some role to play,3 as per our first finding. The
reason is the familiar one that "mountains are flat at the top." Efficient rules maximize
total surplus and by the usual first order condition, this is precisely where the marginal
impact on total surplus of adjusting the rule is zero. Thus, there is initially no
2
 This point may be seen as an incarnation of the doctrine that policies aimed at a specific variable should
attack that variable as directly as possible. Thus in a seminal paper on trade policy, Bhagwati and
Ramaswami2 (1963) advocate subsidizing domestic industry directly rather than aiding domestic industry
via import tariffs: both distort the decisions of domestic producers; taxing imports imposes an additional
distortion on consumer choice.
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countervailing efficiency loss to adjusting damages off of efficient standards for
purposes of equity. Consequently, some adjustment will always be warranted.
Before turning to the body of the paper, it should be noted that our argument here
is made solely within the context of the sort of second best/optimal tax framework
analyzed in KS4. Not considered are the many other dimensions which may determine
the relative efficacy of taxes and legal rules as redistributional tools. The paper does
not, for example, discuss empirical issues, nor the political economy of judges versus
legislators; nor the fact that the application of legal rules is inherently probabilistic.
(As in KS, agents are risk neutral in this paper and so this is of no consequence.) Like
Calabresi (1991), we note only that it is "far from obvious that, as a general matter, tax
and welfare programs are more efficient than a mixture of these and of other rules of
law."5
Yet, the present paper stays within the KS framework only because its purpose is to
challenge the internal consistency of conclusions drawn inside its boundaries, not
because factors external to the model are considered unimportant. On the contrary,
there is good reason to believe that arguments of the sort left out of KS will in the end
be decisive. Indeed, this paper may be seen as an attempt to unclog the overall debate
of any notion that it has already been neatly settled, so that the discussion may flow
freely toward these other more relevant issues.
3
 More precisely, this holds in a model such as that in KS where key functions are assumed to be
continuously differentiable. Otherwise, total surplus could in principal be maximized at a non-
differentiable point.
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The paper consists of four sections. The first presents a modified version of the
KS model. The second makes the three main points of the paper as already discussed.
The last section provides a detailed numerical example. A technical appendix conducts
some of the algebra used in the main text and solves the full optimal tax/damages
problem for general welfare functions.
2. T H E KAPLOW AND SHAVELL M O D E L W H E N HETEROGENEITY IS NOT
RESTRICED TO LABOR MARKETS
To assure the reader that our point is not an esoteric modeling quirk, we will work
from KS's own model. Our chief alteration will be to drop the assumption that agents
are precisely identical in relation to the tort system. This is discussed in more detail
when the tort system is introduced formally below.
The population consists of a continuum of individuals. Each chooses how much
labor H>£>0 to supply,6 and how much care x > 0 to take.
4
 KS shore up their argument against redistributional legal rules with a brief and casual discussion of
several "additional considerations" that do not appear in their model.
5
 As quoted in KS, fn. 3.
6
 We add a maximum amount of labor supply H to the KS model, since without it the model has no
solution. Note that KS need not, and do not actually solve their model to make their argument against
conditioning damages on income.
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2.1 Labor Market
If an individual chooses to work I hours, she earns y = ai in pre-tax income,
where a > 0. Individuals differ according to their (productive) ability a. We discuss
the precise distribution of a below. Ability a is the private information of the
individual. The social planner knows the distribution of a in the entire population, but
is unable to attach specific a 's to specific individuals.
The individual keeps y-t(y) of her pre-tax income, where the function t, the tax
schedule, is a policy variable. The value t(y) may be negative for some levels of v
signifying that an individual with this level of income receives a net transfer from the
government.
2.2 Tort System in KS
In KS if an individual takes care level x then the probability that she causes an
accident will be p(x), where/? is assumed to be strictly decreasing and strictly convex:
p' < 0, p" > 0 . Whenever an accident occurs it causes the same amount of harm h.
Thus the efficient level of damages, the level minimizing the cost of accidents, is d = h .
Harm is born equally by all individuals in the population. The individual causing the
harm must pay damages of d. Like the tax system t, d is a policy variable.
2.3 Individual Choice in KS
In KS an individual with ability a chooses labor I and care x to maximize
expected utility:
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EJj\ £,x;t,d,a =
\ choices J
a£ - t(a£) - £
after tax earnings
p(x)d]- p(h-d) , (KS1)
from Labor Choice
from Care Choice unrecovered harm
caused by others
where p is the average accident probability across the population (defined in more
detail below) and so p(h - d) is the expected amount of unrecovered harm (possibly
negative) befalling this individual.7
2.4 Adding Heterogeneity to KS's Tort System
Scrutiny of (KS1) reveals that the individuals in KS's population are homogeneous
with respect to the tort system in a very strong sense. Whatever the level of damages
d, all agents choose the same level of care, the level x*(d) minimizing x + p(x)d .
More than this, the legal system's contribution to their total utility will also always be
the same, namely vT (d) =-\x* (d) + p(x* (d))d]~ p(h -d).
It will come as no surprise then, that the legal system is useless as a redistributional
tool in the KS model as it stands: trying to redistribute with the legal system in their
model is like trying to play the piano with a two-by-four. To be sure, the validity of
KS's admonition against conditioning damages on income is unaffected by this
simplifying assumption and so it was the right assumption to make in that context. But
in investigating the relative efficacy of taxes versus legal rules as redistributional tools,
it is important that one's simplifying assumptions not dictate the answer.
7
 Note that equation (KS1) is quite a bit simpler than the corresponding equation in KS because, wizened
by their finding, we do not consider making damages contingent on the income of the parties. Note also
that like KS, care choice is not subject to a budget constraint. This simplifies the analysis but does not
change the results.
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Thus we will alter the KS model by adding the realism-enhancing feature that
individuals' differ with respect to their interaction with the tort system. There are
many ways to do this and we have chosen but one—for its simplicity and its ready
analogy to the manner in which KS model differences in labor choice. Thus we keep
the assumption that harms are born equally by all, but stipulate that care choice x
results in an accident probability of p(pc), where care effectiveness y > 0 differs across
individuals.
The efficient level of damages is still d = h , despite the new heterogeneity in care
choice. This is still the level of damages that causes all individuals to equalize the
marginal social costs of care, 1 with its marginal social benefit, yp'h (now
heterogeneous across individuals).
2.5 Individual Choice in the Modified Model
Individuals are now distinguished along two dimensions, productive ability a and
care effectiveness y and individual (a,y) chooses labor I and care x to maximize






from Care Choice ""recoveredIharai
caused by others
We introduce some additional notation to describe the solution to the individual's
choice problem. Let f(t,a) and x*(d,y) be the expected utility-maximizing choice of
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leisure and care8 by an individual of productive ability a and care effectiveness y when
faced with tax system t and damages rule d. Our notation reflects the fact that the
choice of labor and care are separable under KS's utility function. Let
v(t,d,a,y) s EU(f(t,a),x*{d,y);t,d,a,y) (3)
be the individuals' indirect utility function, the maximum level of expected utility
attainable for individual (a,y) when taxes are t and damages are d. We can divide
indirect utility into two parts: the utility derived from optimal labor choice,
vL(t,d,a) = af(t,a) - t(af(t,a)) - f(t,a), (4)
and the utility derived from the tort system:
vT{d,y) = -x{d,y)-p{yx\d,y))-p(h-d). (5)
2.6 The Population Distribution
We represent the population distribution of ability a and care effectiveness y with
the joint density function f(a,y) over pairs of non-negative numbers.9 The density
need not have full support. From this joint distribution/, we can recover the
population density of each parameter individually. Thus we write
f(a) = I f{a,y) dy and f(y) = I f(a,y) da for the marginal density of ability a
and care effectiveness y, respectively. Note then that the probability of injury faced by
8
 Two technical notes: 1) Because of the separability of expected utility, optimal leisure depends only on
a and optimal care, only on y; 2) For ease of exposition, we will proceed as if the tax schedule and
damages considered are such that first order conditions provide a unique solution. Nothing is lost if this
assumption is relaxed. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1990).
9
 Here also we have generalized KS, in which a is assumed to be distributed uniformly between 0 and 1.
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any individual in the population—in this model, the population average probability of
harm-is p =
2.7 Representing the Equity/Efficiency Trade-off with a Social Welfare Function
We are interested in determining what the optimal tax system and damages rule
would be if we were concerned not just about the "total" well-being in our economy,
but also about how that total is distributed among our population. To consider these
issues with precision and consistency, we imagine the problem faced by a fictional
"social planner" who chooses the tax system t and the damages rule d to maximize a
well-defined "social welfare function." The social welfare function will express the
planner's preferences over policy variables and will incorporate in a coherent manner
the planner's attitude toward what is casually thought of as the equity /efficiency trade-
off. Positing a social welfare function is the usual manner such issues are considered in
the optimal tax literature.
We suppose that the planner chooses t and d to maximize the following weighted
sum of individual utilities:
SWF(t,d) = [[W(v(t,d,a,y))dady , (6)
where W is the weighting function. In the main text of the paper, we analyze the case
in which Wis the increasing side of an upside-down parabola:10
W{v) = bv-\av2, (7)
Appendix B considers more general social welfare functions.
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where a and b are nonnegative constants. Thus, W increases at a decreasing rate until
reaching a maximum at £ . We assume that b is large enough so that W is always
increasing in v over the relevant range.
Several things are worth noting about this social welfare function. First, the fact
that W increases in v means that the planner's preferences over policy variables respect
Pareto superiority. In other words, if all individuals are better off at taxes t and
damages d than at taxes t' and damages d\ the planner prefers t, d to t\ d'. Of course,
this does not mean that the planner's solution will be Pareto optimal if that term is
defined relative to what is feasible in a first best world, i.e., relative to what is feasible
when the planner can observe each agents' a and y.
Secondly, the planner is concerned about equity to the extent that Ws slope,
W'{y), is decreasing in v—i.e. the extent to which W is concave. When (and only
when) this is the case, the planner would, if given the opportunity, choose to make a
one-for-one transfer from a well-off individual v to a less well-off individual v. Since
W flattens as it increases, the increase in social welfare from "transferring utils" to the
less well-off will exceed the decrease in social welfare from transferring from the more
well-off. Of course, in the second best world we consider, such transfers can only be
effected by altering taxes and damages. Thus one-for-one transfers will not in general
be possible—resources will be lost in transit due to the distortionary effects of the only
tools at our disposal. Nevertheless, an equity concerned social planner will tolerate
some "leakage in the bucket"—even if less arrives at the less well-off, the fact that each
util that survives the transfer has a net positive impact on social welfare, may outweigh
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the fact that other utils are lost along the way. The extent of the social planner's
tolerance for such leaks is reflected in the speed at which W flattens, for this determines
the net gain from the utils that survive the transfer. Thus, the speed at which W flattens
is a precise representation of the weight that the planner places on equity in the
equity/efficiency trade-off.
Given the quadratic form (7), W'(y) = b-av . Thus the planner is concerned about
equity if and only if the parameter a is strictly positive. If a is zero, then W(y) = bv ,
and so the planner maximizes (b times) the sum of individual utilities, with no concern
for how the sum is distributed. The efficient tax system t and damages rule d are those
that optimize social welfare in this case. The reader can check that setting damages
equal to harm and imposing no tax system is efficient.
The last thing to note about the planner's problem is that we have written social
welfare as a function of optimized utility, v(t,d,a,y). This reflects the fact that the
planner takes into account how individuals react to her choice of policy instruments, t
and d.
3. ANALYSIS OF THE MODIFIED KS MODEL
In this section we give formal content to the three main points of the paper: 1) even
in the presence of an optimal income tax, any. concern for equity dictates that legal rules
deviate from efficient standards in a manner that aids the less well-off—this, so long as
there is any. heterogeneity in the way that agents respond to the legal system; 2) when,
in addition, income differences are predominant in over-all inequality, legal rules
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should in fact be adjusted away from efficient standards in a manner that helps low-
income individuals; 3) under certain additional conditions, legal rules should be
specifically adjusted to correct income-based inequality.
3.1 Optimally Inefficient Damages
Should we set damages at their efficient level? If not, in what direction should they
be adjusted? To answer these questions we need only examine the derivative of social
welfare with respect to d and evaluate that derivative at efficient damages d = h and
optimal taxes (given d = h). If this derivative differs from zero, then the answer to our
first question is no: efficient damages are not optimal. We can then examine the sign of
this derivative and more importantly, what determines that sign, to answer the second
question.
Some simple algebra (performed in an Appendix A) reduces the damages derivative
of social welfare to:
SWFd(t,d) = -(b-av)pd(h-d) + acov[v,p], (8)
Efficiency Effect Equity Effect
where v = \\v(t,d,a,y)f(a,y) is average well-being and pd is the derivative of the
average accident probability with respect to d.
Consider first the term labeled "Efficiency Effect." When the social planner has
no concern for equity {a = 0), but rather acts simply to maximize (b times) the simple
sum of individual well-being, the derivative of social welfare with respect to damages
consists solely of this term:
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a = 0 => SWFd(t,d) = -bpd (h-d).
Setting d = //—setting damages "efficiently"—zeroes out this term and so (given
second order conditions) maximizes aggregate well-being.
The flip side of this observation, however, is that when the planner is concerned
with equity (a > 0) , and we evaluate the derivative SWFd at efficient damages d = h,




This equity term says that the social welfare derivative with respect to d is proportional
to the covariance of well-being v and accident proneness p, with the constant of
proportionality a being a measure of equity concern.
To understand what lies behind this covariance term and why it is an "Equity
Effect," suppose for the moment that the well-off tend to be accident prone, i.e.
cov[v,/>] > 0 . Then SWFd(t,d) > 0 and the planner will want to raise damages above
harm. Why? When well-being and accident proneness vary together, the less well-off
will cause fewer than average accidents. Since the average probability of accidents p
is each individual's probability of injury, this means that the less well-off tend to
receive damages more often than they rjay. them. The converse is true for the more
well-off. Thus, in this case raising damages effects a transfer from well-off to less
well-off.
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If, on the other hand, the less well-off tend to be accident prone cov[v, p] < 0, then
the planner will want to lower damages below harm. Since the less well-off now pay
damages more often than they receive them and vice versa for the well-off, this is now
the adjustment that effects a transfer from well-off to less well-off.
Now any planner concerned with equity—any planner putting more weight on the
less-well off—is predisposed to make such a transfer. This, so long as the efficiency
loss—the leak in the bucket—is not too great. The point is that starting from d = h, the
leak will never be too great to preclude at least some movement off of efficiency. That
the Efficiency Effect drops out at d = h reflects the fact that the marginal efficiency
loss from moving off efficient damages will be zero.
Will it ever happen that setting damages efficiently is socially optimal? This is the
same as asking whether SWFd(t,ti) = acov[v,p] will ever be zero. As already noted, if
our concept of social welfare contains no concern for equity—that is, a = 0 — then
<zcov[v,/?] vanishes and setting damages equal to harm d - h is in fact optimal.
Moreover, if there is no heterogeneity in tort, so that p is constant across the
population—as in the original KS model—then acov[v,/?] vanishes again (the
covariance of any random variable and a constant is zero) and efficient damages are
best. Lastly, if there is no variation in well-being across agents, so that v is constant
across agents, then acov[v,/>] again vanishes.
Sanchirico 17 Taxes versus Legal Rules
This last case can be immediately ruled out: in particular, no tax system11—let
alone the optimal one—will eliminate all differences in well-being. The most obvious
residual differences will be those due to tort utility. But it is crucial to note that even
within the realm of labor utility, an income tax can never fully eliminate utility
differences due to productivity differences.
To see this, note first that the productive individual need not work as hard to earn
the after-tax income, call it e , implied by the unproductive individual's optimal choice
of labor. Thus were both individuals to choose to work however many hours would
yield them each e , the productive individual would have higher labor utility as between
the two. And if the productive does better than the best the unproductive can do when
she chooses labor to earn e , then certainly she does better when she chooses labor to
maximize her utility.
Having ruled out the possibility that v is constant across the population, we
conclude that so long as there is any concern for equity (a > 0) and any heterogeneity
in tort (p varies), efficient damages will be optimal only in the case that v and/? vary in
a way that is perfectly orthogonal (cov[v,/?] = 0). Where, as here, perfect
orthogonality is not imposed by the structure of the model, it is a knife-edge
phenomenon that can be safely neglected. We conclude:
OBSERVATION 1: So long as there is any heterogeneity at all in the tort system and
any concern for equity, efficient damages will not be socially optimal. In
11
 More precisely, no tax system under which at least some individuals choose to work at least some
amount.
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particular, when the well-off tend to be relatively (less) accident prone, social
welfare can be increased by raising (lowering) damages above (below) their
efficient level.
3.2 Helping the Poor
The reader will notice that we have been careful in the previous section to use the
somewhat awkward phrasing "less well-off" and "more well-off" rather than "poor"
and "rich," or "high income" and "low income." Any serious discussion of equity
must be centered on some notion of overall well-being that accounts for the utility
effects of hours worked and the utility contribution of the tort system—income, even
wealth and consumption, are merely proxies for the real target.
This does not, however, preclude the possibility that one or several of these
together form a good proxy for overall well-being—that, for example, the "poor" are in
fact less well-off. Adjusting damages to help the less well-off will then be essentially
the same as adjusting damages to help the poor.
How can this be reconciled with KS? It is crucial to note that we will not be
conditioning damages in each case on the income of the parties. Rather we will be
shifting damages in the same direction for all parties in a way that we have calculated
will tend to help the poor. In particular—and this is the operative distinction—an
individual will not affect her own expected damages by earning more or less income.
Thus, KS's double distortion argument will not apply. The general point here is that
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the double distortion argument against equity-inspired adjustments to legal rules is a
narrow obstacle; side-stepping it still leaves a lot of room to maneuver.
Formally, we will show that when after-tax income is the predominant cause of
inequality in well-being, then we should adjust damages to help the "poor." We
accomplish this via a simple rearrangement of (8). As noted, total welfare v = vL + vT
is the sum of labor welfare and tort welfare. Further, vL = e -1, where e = ai- t(al)
is after-tax income. Then using a familiar rule for the covariance12 we may write,
SWFd(t,h) = acov[v,p]
r T llv ,p\
= acov[e,p]-acov[£,p] + acov\vT ,p\
Working with the correlation coefficient 1 > corr[Z,7] = C0J(v^y) > -1 rather than the
co variance will allow us to talk about the degree to which two variables vary together,
independent of their scale. Thus, multiplying and dividing through by various standard
deviations yields finally,
SWFd{t,h) oc %Qon[e,p]-%con[l,p] + ^corr[v r , />] (10)
This expression tells us that the change in social welfare SWFd(t,ti) from increasing
damages d above harm h is proportional to ("cc ") a weighted sum13 of the correlation
between accident proneness p on the one hand and after-tax income e, labor supply £
12
 Namely, cov(X + Y,Z) = cov(X,Z) + cov(7,Z).
13
 The weights will not necessarily add to one.
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and tort well-being vT on the other. The weights reflect the importance of each welfare
source in the distribution of overall well-being v.
We see then that if differences in after-tax income are important determinant of
overall inequality—that is, if %- is relatively large compared to ^ and ^-—then the
sign and size of the welfare change from increasing damages d will follow the sign and
size of the correlation corr[e,/>] between after tax income and accident proneness.
Thus,
OBSERVATION!: If the labor market is the predominant source of inequality in
overall well-being, then social welfare increases when damages are adjusted away
from their efficient level in a manner that helps low-income individuals.
3.3 "Cross Over"
We have seen that the equity conscious social planner will always make equity
based adjustments in damages, and that quite plausibly these will be made specifically
to help low income individuals. In this section we go one step further and show that
these adjustments may actually be disequalizing within the realm of tort. This is
significant because it is sufficient (though not necessary) to conclude that the damages
adjustments are being made specifically to mitigate labor market inequality. We call
this general phenomenon cross over.
To see how this would come about, suppose momentarily that the planner cares
only about tort well-being. As should be clear from the previous analysis, the
derivative of social welfare with respect to d evaluated at d = h would then reduce to
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acovfv7 ,p\.
The analysis of this term essentially tracks the above analysis of acov[v,p], except that
here there is only one possibility: the covariance acov[V,/?] is always negative since
the accident prone are always tort worse off.14 Thus an equity conscious social planner,
who for some reason cares only about tort well-being will choose to lower damages
below their efficient level in order to help the less well-off in tort. The opposite
adjustment would be disequalizing within the realm of tort.
But when the equity conscious planner cares about total well-being, the opposite
adjustment is quite plausible. In particular, we know from the second to last line in
(21) that when labor inequality is predominant in overall inequality, then the sign of
SWFd(t,h) will follow cov|V',/?l. This will in turn be positive when those who are
well-off in labor markets tend to be accident prone, as when a and y are negatively
correlated. Thus:
OBSERVATION 3: When labor markets are the predominant source of overall
inequality and the rich tend to be relatively accident prone, then the equity
14
 On the one hand, the care effective are always better off in tort for the same reason (explained above)
that the productive are better off in the labor market: the care effective individual can produce the care
ineffective individual's optimal accident probability with less care effort. On the other hand, the care
effective individual always has a greater care effect yx since her effort cost for each unit of care effect is
lower. Therefore tort well-being v and accident proneness/? move in opposite directions as we vary
care effectiveness y. This in turn implies a negative covariance.
Formally, defining c = yx , the agent chooses c to minimize j + p(c)d . Then vy = cy~2 > 0 .
Also, applying the implicit function theorem to the first order condition, y- - p c ( c ) d = 0 yields
cy = 2
X
 d > 0 . So py = pccy < 0 . Thusp moves against v as y varies.
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conscious social planner will wish to raise damages above their efficient level and
this will be done specifically to mitigate labor market inequality.
4. ILLUSTRATIVE NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
The last section concerns local adjustments off of efficient damages, but does not
characterize the global optimum. This is in line with most of the optimal tax literature
and is generated by the difficulty of deriving analytical solutions in this sort of
problem. In this section we report the optimal tax and damages rule in an extended
numerical example to show how all three of the points made in the last section extend to
the global solution.15
The example was calculated using an Excel spreadsheet. Instead of a continuum of
different a 's and y's as in KS, we set up a square grid of possible values. The grid was
11x11 and ran in each dimension—a and y—from .1 to 10.1. We then posited a
population distribution on this grid. As shown in Figure 1, this distribution was
specifically chosen so that productive ability and care effectiveness would be negatively
correlated. The lightest region represents (a ,y) pairs populated by three agents, the
darkest, two agents, and the remaining region, one agent.
15
 The example is not intended to be a calculation of optimal policies for the real economy.
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Figure 1 : The Joint Distribution of Ability and Care Effectiveness
The other parameters and functional forms we used in the example are given in
Table 1.
LABOR MARKET
Maximum Labor Supply, H
TORT SYSTEM
Accident Probability Function, p(yx)
Harm of each Accident, h







Table 1: Parameters for Numerical Example
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4.1 Efficient Solution
With any. parameters, as with these, the full efficient solution—the solution that
maximizes the straight sum of individual utilities, or equivalently, social welfare with
a = 0 —is to set damages equal to harm and construct a tax system that induces every
agent with productivity a exceeding 1 (the marginal disutility of labor) to work the
maximum number of hours H. One (but not the only) tax system that accomplishes this
is t(y) = 0 for ally.
4.2 Efficient Damages with Optimal Taxation
The efficient damages solution is the social optimum given the welfare function
specified in the table, but under the constraint that damages are set efficiently.
4.2.1 Optimal Taxes with Efficient Damages
The optimal tax under this restriction turns out to be one that induces all agents
with ability a over the higher threshold of 2.1 to work all the time H and agents with
ability below 2.1 to work not at all. (Indeed as shown in Appendix B, this bang-bang
pattern of labor supply is a general property of the KS model).
To find a tax schedule inducing individuals to work in this pattern, consider for any
constant C the following schedule as graphed in Figure 2
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- C , y<acH
y-H\ny-(H-H\nacH)-C, y>acH' (11)
-C
Slope = 1 - v
a
cH
Figure 2: The Optimal Income Tax Schedule {Modulo C)
The implied increasing marginal tax rate is then
. f l-^L, y<acH
t (v) = < ay{y)
 [1-f, y>acH
Thus the marginal increase in after tax income from earning another dollar of pre-tax
income is:
-L, y<acH
Thus the net utility gain for individual a from earning another dollar of pretax income
is:
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This is always (over all y) positive for individuals with a > ac and never larger than
-r - •£ , and so always negative, for individuals with a <ac. Thus this schedule
induces the choice of labor desired by the planner. The constant C can then be adjusted
to insure fiscal balance.
Thus the planner essentially employs a tax cum uniform transfer scheme. The
"tax" portion (i.e., neglecting Q is progressive in the sense that both the marginal and
average tax rates increase in pre-tax income. The net effect of the tax is to collect
resources from those with ability exceeding some critical level. The tax rate harms
work incentives in the KS model only in the very stark sense here that fewer agents
work at all as compared to a no tax regime; those who continue to work continue to
work the same amount, which is always. The revenues from the tax are then
transferred equally to all individuals.
4.2.2 Derivative of Social Welfare with Respect to Damages
As in the previous section we can examine the derivative of social welfare with
respect to damages at this efficient damages solution in order to determine whether and
how damages should be adjusted relative to harm. We will then compare this to the
global solution. We know that this derivative can be written in two ways both of which
concern various statistics of dispersion and correlation. These are collected in the
following table:






























We see immediately from the northeastern-most cell that total well-being is
positively correlated with accident proneness. Since the welfare function exhibits some
equity concern (a = 1), (and the covariance is proportional to the correlation) the
covariance formula in (8) tells us that social welfare will increase if we increase
damages above their efficient level.
With respect to the role of income in this derivative, we see from the middle
column that after tax income is the major component of overall well-being and that it
too is positively correlated with accident proneness. Specifically, equation (10) here
calculates as
SWFd(t,h) ex ^Corv(e,p)-^con(£,p) + ^corr(vI\p)
= (1.52) x 0.25 - (.68) x 0.38 + (.01) x (-1.00)
=.38 - .26 - .01 (12)
=.12 - .01
= 11
Thus when we adjust damages upward to aid the less well-off, we are essentially
adjusting damages upward to help the poor—income differences are what drive
differences in well-being in this example.
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4.3 Optimal Solution
In line with this local analysis, the spreadsheet reports that the full optimal
solution—in which taxes and damages are both allowed to vary—is to keep essentially
the same tax system as in Section 4.2.1, but raise damages from 100% of harm to































Two things are worth noting about this table in comparison with the table for the
efficient damages solution: In the first place, the reader will see from its standard
deviation that tort well-being has actually become less equal as a result of the increase
in damages—with the realm of torts, our adjustment has been disequalizing. Our
increase in damages hurts the care ineffective, who are already worse-off in tort. But
the care ineffective tend to be productive and productivity is the chief determinant of
inequality. The equity conscious social planner is using the damage adjustment to
effect a transfer from well-off to less well-off. The transfer has costs—efficiency costs
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within the realm of tort. But until damages reach 145 % of harm, these are outweighed
by the welfare gains of the effective transfer.
As a final aside, it is worth noting that accident proneness and total well-being
remain correlated when damages are set to 145% of harm. One might be tempted to
conclude from that social welfare can be further increased by continuing to raise
damages beyond 145%. Recall, however, the efficiency term in the social welfare
derivative (8) reappears as damages rise above harm and militates with greater and
greater intensity against further increases in d.
5. REMARKS
5.1 Damages as a Blunt Instrument
The tool we make available to our policy maker for regulating the tort system is far
more primitive than the tool for regulating labor markets. With respect to torts, the
policy maker works only with a single number, d, whereas in the labor market, the
policy maker is free to choose any tax schedule. t(y), including those that are
progressive with a continuum of tax brackets. It is important to note that this lopsided
specification cuts in favor of our argument. The fact that we will find an equity role
for the tort system, even when the cards are so stacked against it, strengthens the case
for using torts redistributionally when, as in the real world, more flexible tools are
available.
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5.2 Informational Requirements
One might object that the information necessary for the proper adjustment of
damages is simply unavailable to the real world policy maker. Yet on a practical level,
one must be willing to argue not just that the information necessary to alter damages
precisely is missing, but that our limited knowledge means that our best guess at the
proper adjustment is worse that no adjustment at all. In any event, use of the income
tax for redistributional purposes has information problems of the same or greater
magnitude, and so the information argument in general terms says nothing about the
relative efficacy of the two methods.
5.3 Optimal Taxes, Hypothetical Income Tax-Only Results and KS's "Qualifications"
In the context of the economics literature on optimal taxation,16 there is little novel
about the argument we have provided. Legal rules like those considered in KS are in
the first instance correctives for externalities in the manner of the classic Pigouvian tax.
In a "first best world," where it is possible to tailor lump sum transfers based on
agents' personal characteristics, the optimal corrective tax is indeed the Pigouvian,
equating marginal and private social costs. But in a second best world, where personal
characteristics are private information and personalized lump-sum transfers are thus
precluded, the optimal corrective for externalities—even in the context of optimized
taxes for all other commodities—deviates from what Pigou prescribed. The extent of
the deviation is a matter of balancing distributional benefits with distortionary effects.
16
 See, e.g. Sandmo (1975) or the treatment of this paper in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), p. 451-454.
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We have shown how that balancing would be accomplished in the simple tort
externality model presented in KS.17
A sub-literature on optimal taxes considers conditions under which it would be
optimal to tax only labor income. Without mentioning the literature on externalities
just discussed, KS cite this sub-literature in support of their apparent claim that legal
rules should be set efficiently. In the first place, contrary to their discussion, this
literature is not in fact related to their valid and important argument against
conditioning on income. With regard to the broader argument for setting rules
efficiently, it is worth remarking that the conditions needed are both extremely
restrictive theoretically and ungrounded empirically. A reading of this sub-literature's
later stages18 indicates that the spirit of these results was more as an answer to the
hypothetical question "what would it take" for it to be optimal to tax only income. In
this light, the conditions identified, given their restrictiveness, are more an argument
against solely taxing income than for.
Essentially, the conditions require: 1) that individuals differ in their underlying
characteristics only as these relate to labor/leisure choice, and even further 2) that the
marginal rate of substitution between any two commodities not be affected by labor
17
 In a more general model, the tort externality is a more complicated issue because it is inherently
probabilistic. This complication does not crop up in KS because their agents are risk neutral. Nor does
the complication alter the main point in a more general setting.
18
 The literature culminates in Deaton (1981). Deaton (1981) presents these conditions not to argue that
income taxes should be exclusively employed, but to show why existing empirical studies seeking to
actually calculate optimal taxes were building a great deal of their results into their maintained
hypotheses, since they were forced to adopt these conditions due to data limitations.
Those interested in this literature should note that there seems to be an error in the earlier Deaton
(1976). All individuals' Engel curves need to be parallel; it is not sufficient that they are individually
linear, since if they have different slopes then consumption on commodity n is not some uniform constant
proportion of total expenditure. Compare the discussion in Deaton (1976) with the later discussion in
Deaton (1981), which specifically mentions the requirement that Engel curves be parallel.
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income, so that differences in underlying characteristics related to labor/leisure choice
do not manifest in other non-labor choices. Taken together, the assumptions amount to
the supposition that all economic activities save labor/leisure choice are useless as
signals of individuals' underlying characteristics.
5.4 Other Sources of Heterogeneity viz. the Tort System
We introduce heterogeneity directly into the care decision in our model, but this is
not the only way to do so. In line with the previous remark, it is worth noting that if
we were willing to work with more general utility functions, we could derive similar
results for populations of individuals that differ only in their productive ability.
Heterogeneity in the tort system would then arise from the interaction between leisure
choice and care choice. We declined to take this approach because it much more
difficult mathematically and no more plausible.
5.5 Adding Legal Costs
The assumption that court cases use resources will not change the character of our
results. As shown in Rubinfeld and Polinsky (1988), what will change, potentially, is
the efficient level of damages. The proposition that we will always want to (further)
alter damages for reasons of equity will continue to hold. Though the top of the
mountain will have shifted, it will still be flat on top.
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5.6 Decoupling
We remind the reader that we have imposed the restriction that damages paid equal
damages received in every case. The fact that the optimal policy may deviate from this
in an optimal tax setting is yet another reason for decoupling. For two other reasons
see Polinsky and Che (1991) and Sanchirico (1997).
5.7 More Information from Court Cases
There is yet another possibly even more important reason to alter damages from
their efficient level that we have not considered. This is the fact that court cases are
likely to reveal much more information about the underlying characteristics of the
individuals involved than just the harm that they have caused. To the extent that this
information is yet another signal of individuals' underlying characteristics it will be
optimal to condition upon it. We leave consideration of this very interesting issue to
future research.
6. CONCLUSION
After all is said, Kaplow and Shavell (1994) are to be applauded for correcting the
harmful misperception that it may be optimal to condition legal rules on the income
(wealth, consumption, occupation, etc.) of the parties. Yet their apparent conclusion
that there is therefore no loss to setting legal rules solely on the basis of efficiency goes
too far. The argument that damages not be made contingent on income is simply not an
argument for ignoring equity in setting legal rules. The close association in their paper
of these two distinct assertions runs the risk that the compactness and solidity of the
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first will be attributed to the unproven and unprovable later. Our paper has attempted
to guard against this risk by highlighting equity's role in the optimal choice of legal
rules within their own framework. If nothing else, this exercise suggests that the
ultimate determination of this important issue lies elsewhere.
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7. APPENDIX A: THE DAMAGES DERIVATIVE OF SOCIAL WELFARE
Here we show how to derive equation (8). The derivative of SWF(t,d) in d is:
SWFd(t,d) = l\w'(v(t,d,a,y))vi!(t,d,a,r)f(a,y), (13)
where vd is the derivative of optimal individual utility.
Given v(t,d,a,y) = \af -t(crt*}- f\-\x* + p(yx*)</]-p(h-d), we obtain
v< = -p + p - pd (h - d) - [l + ypxd\x"d. Since the optimizing individual chooses x so that 1 + ypxd = 0,
vd(t,d,a,y) = -pd(h-d)-(p-p). (14)
Substituting (14) into (13) and rearranging yields (8). Here are the explicit steps:
SWFd (t,d) = - j | W'(v)[pd (h-d) +(p- p)]f
= -jj W(y)p,{h - d)f - \\ W'(v)(p - p)f
= -l\(b-av)pd(h-d)f -\\(b-av)(p-p)f
= -pd (h - d)\\ (b - av)f - b\j (p - p)f + a\\ v{p - p)f
= -pd (h - d)(b -dv) + a\\ (v - v)(p - p)f + ajj v(p - p)f
0
= -(b-av)pd(h-d) + a\\(v-v){p-p)f
— —(b - av)pd {h-d) + a cov[v, p\.
8. APPENDIX B: GENERAL SOLUTION
Here we provide a more general solution to the optimal tax problem posed by the modified KS
model. The techniques employed are familiar from the optimal tax and mechanism design literatures
(See, e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole [1990]). The only potential complication is that our type space is two-
dimensional, but since there is full separability across dimensions, the problem reduces to essentially two
applications of the single dimensional technique.
We will reduce the planner's problem to one in which she chooses damages d and, subject to
incentive constraints, how much l(a) each individual works. To this end, it is initially more convenient
to proceed as if individual agents choose y = ai and c = yx . By the envelope theorem,
va(a,y) = ^ >0, (15)
vr(a,y) = ^ f>0, (16)
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where we have suppressed the notation for t and d.
These equations allow us to express the well-being of an arbitrary individual in terms of the well-
being of the lowest type, which we will assume without loss of generality to be {a,y) = (l,l) .
More formally, we break the difference down into an a change and a y change:
v(a,y) - v(l,l) = (v(a,y) - v(a,\)) + (v(a,l) - v(l,l)) .
Then we apply the fundamental lemma of calculus to v(a,l) viewed as a function solely of a
v(a,l)-v(l,l)= f v (a,\)da = \" ^-da
and v(a,y) viewed as a function solely of y
(17)
(Note how the fixed variable in both expressions drops out.) Combining yields:
v(\,\) = v(a,y)- [*f (18)
Now we solve for v(l,l). First, we substitute from the definition of v(a,y)
f-da - (19)
Next, we integrate (19) over the full range of ( a ,y). The left hand side is just
JJv(\,\)f(a,y)da dy = v(l,l) . The right hand side is:
^da\ f(a,y) dy da-
=
 f f v^ ~ J," r ^  f^ d^ da ~ f r ^ ^ ^ d^
= ^ Ji vf - J J_ 4r- f(a) da da-) J ~-f(y) dy dy
=
 f f v/ ' i'^1 ~ F^d" ~ f ^ 0 -
f-dy]f(a,y) dy da
[integrate out a and y]
[Change order of integration]
Working with A in (20),
J, J, v(a,y)f(a,y)dady
= f If ly(a) - rW«)) - ^T1]/^, Y) da dy - [ J" [^ +
-[[i[p{h-d)]f(a,y)dady
a, y) da dy
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«)"*r]f(«)da ~ f'(><«))/(«)- H T 1 + p(c(rMf(r)dr - f(h-d).
Now budget balance for the government (equivalently resource balance in the consumable commodity)
requires I t(y(a))f(a) = S , where 5 is some exogenously required surplus (or allowable deficit, if
negative). Further, by our implicit assumption that damages and recovery are coupled and legal costs are
nil, average damages paid equal average damages received. Hence, the chain of equalities continues as:
Substituting back into (20) yields
v(l,l) = f [(« -1) - ^]i(a)f(a)da - f [(l + ^ )x(y) + p{pc{r))h\f{r)dr -S (21)
where h(a) =
 x
f}"\ and h(y) = —^ are the hazard rates for marginal distributions of a and y. This
expression, (21), is what we will use for v(l,l).
Now we step back and notice that together (18) and (21) allow us to express v(a,y) solely in terms
of £(a) and d. Modulo incentive constraints, we may then proceed as if the social planner chooses these
two objects. As is well known the incentive constraint for i(a) boils down to the requirement that it be
non-decreasing. '9 The problem in these terms is:
Choose d and piecewise continuously differentiable t(a) to
MAXIMIZE
where
v(«,r) = M«,r) + v(u)
subject to
x(/) minimizes x + p(jx)d
£(a) is non-decreasing.
0 < £(a) < H
J"JV(v(o,y))/(a,y)
7









We assume that W is continuously differentiable and individualistic ( W > 0) . As discussed in the
text, the social planner is equity concerned to the extent that Wis concave, i.e. the extent to which
19
 The requirement that labor supply be non-decreasing and that first order conditions hold is equivalent
to the requirement that agents optimize with respect to their announced types. The requirement that first
order conditions hold is equivalent to the envelope condition used in the main text. For details, see
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), Chapter 7.
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W'(v) is decreasing in v. If, for example, Whas the form W(v) = ^  where <j> e $R, then the more
negative <f> the more relatively concave W. Moreover, in the limit as ^ approaches -oo the welfare
function approaches that of the Rawlsian.20
8.1 Optimal Tax Schedule
Writing X(a) for the multipliers associated with constraint21 (24), the first order condition with
respect to i(a) is:
Inspection of (18) and (21) show that the left hand side is not a function of t{fi) . Thus, 1(0) is either 0
or H at an optimum. Since £ (/?) must be non-decreasing, there must be some critical a° such that
l{a) = 0 all a <a and t(a) = H , all a > a . See Section 4.2.1 for a tax system that induces this
labor supply pattern.
8.2 Optimal Damages Rule: First Order Condition for General W
We now turn to the optimal level of damages d. We will derive the generalization of (8).
Returning to the original expression for v(a,y) and applying the envelope theorem yields, as in
Appendix A, vd = p - p - pd(h - d) . Differentiating the objective (22) with respect to d and then
applying the techniques in Appendix A gives:
SWFd =-pd(h-d)W'-cov[W'(v),p] (26)
Efficiency Effect Equity Effect
In comparing this expression to equation (8) in the main text, the Equity Effect requires some additional
discussion. It is the covariance between individuals' accident probabilities and their marginal social
welfare weights, W'(y(a,y)) . When the planner is equity conscious, W declines in well-being. When
the more well-off are more accident prone, p increases in well-being and the covariance cov[W(v),p] is
negative. This corresponds to the case in which cov[v,/?] is positive. On the other hand, when the
more well-off are more careful, p and W move together and co\\W'(y), p] is positive. This
corresponds to the case in which cov[v,/?] is negative.
20
 For more details, see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
21
 With general welfare functions it is not a foregone conclusion that labor supply will be non-decreasing,
if we solve the problem ignoring that constraint. Therefore, we add this extra multiplier.
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